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ACLU v. Clapper: The Fourth Amendment     
in the Digital Age 
ERIN E. CONNARE† 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 6, 2013, the British newspaper The Guardian 
published the first of several leaks of classified information 
regarding the United States Government’s intelligence 
surveillance and collection programs.1 A classified document, 
provided by former National Security Agency (“NSA”) 
contract employee and whistleblower Edward Snowden,2 
revealed a Secondary Order issued by Judge Roger Vinson of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) on April 
25, 2013.3 The FISC order, set to expire on July 19, 2013, 
compelled Verizon Business Network Services (“Verizon”) to 
  
† Executive Publications Editor, Buffalo Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2015, 
SUNY Buffalo Law School; B.A. in Psychology and Social Sciences, SUNY at 
Buffalo. Very special thanks to my editor, Paul Bartlett, Ryan Ganzenmuller, and 
the members of the Buffalo Law Review for all of their hard work in readying my 
Note for publication. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their undying 
love and support, without which I would not be where I am today. 
 1. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon 
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. 
 2. Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill & Laura Poitras, Edward Snowden: 
The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 11, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-
snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance.  
 3. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Secondary Order, BR 13-80 (FISA Ct. 
Apr. 25, 2013). 
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“produce . . . and continue production on an ongoing daily 
basis . . . all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ 
created by Verizon for communications (i) between the 
United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United 
States, including local telephone calls.”4 The order further 
provided that “no person shall disclose to any other person 
that the FBI or NSA has sought or obtained tangible things 
under this Order.”5 In response to The Guardian’s 
unauthorized disclosure, the U.S. Government confirmed the 
existence of the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection 
Program (“the Program”).6 Shortly thereafter, The Guardian 
published additional information regarding secret NSA 
surveillance programs, including revealing the Internet data-
collection program PRISM7 and the data-mining tool 
Boundless Informant.8 
These public revelations have led to the filing of several 
lawsuits.9 This Note assesses ACLU v. Clapper, an action 
brought before the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York and decided by Judge William H. Pauley III on 
December 27, 2013.10 In Clapper, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”), the American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation, the New York Civil Liberties Union, and 
the New York Civil Liberties Foundation brought suit 
against several Executive Branch department and agency 
  
 4. Id. at 1-2. (omission added). 
 5. Id. at 2. 
 6. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY 
METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT (Aug. 9, 2013), available 
at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Section215.pdf [hereinafter WHITE 
PAPER]. 
 7. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User 
Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. 
 8. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, Boundless Informant: The NSA’s 
Secret Tool to Track Global Surveillance Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-
datamining.  
 9. See, e.g., In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (2013); Klayman v. 
Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 10. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 724. 
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heads—Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, 
NSA Director and Central Security Service Chief Keith 
Alexander, Secretary of Defense Charles Hagel, Attorney 
General Eric Holder, and FBI Director James Comey.11 
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that: (1) the 
Program exceeded the statutory authority granted by Section 
215 of the USA Patriot Act; and (2) the Program violated the 
First and Fourth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution.12 In addition, Plaintiffs sought a permanent 
injunction enjoining the Government from continuing 
collection of their telephony metadata.13 After an extremely 
in-depth analysis of the issues presented, Judge Pauley 
rejected Plaintiffs’ claims and granted the Government’s 
motion to dismiss.14 
I. THE NSA’S BULK TELEPHONY METADATA COLLECTION 
PROGRAM 
To fully comprehend Judge Pauley’s ruling, it is 
important to understand just what exactly the Bulk 
Telephony Metadata Collection Program is and what it does. 
The Program’s central purpose is terrorism prevention.15 The 
Program operates under the “business records” provision of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).16 The 
business records provision of FISA allows the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), or an authorized 
designee of the Director, to apply to the FISC for  
an order requiring the production of any “tangible things” for an 
investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not 
concerning a United States person or to protect against 
  
 11. Id. at 730. 
 12. Id. at 735. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. at 757. 
 15. Declaration of Teresa H. Shea, Signals Intelligence Director, National 
Security Agency ¶ 44, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 
13-cv-3994) [hereinafter Shea Declaration]. 
 16. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012). This provision of FISA was enacted by 
Section 215 of the Patriot Act. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 
115 Stat. 272. 
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international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, 
provided that such investigation of a United States person is not 
conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the [F]irst 
[A]mendment to the Constitution.17  
These applications must include both “a statement of facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized 
investigation,” and “an enumeration of the minimization 
procedures” in place.18  
Since May 2006, the FBI has used Section 215 to obtain 
FISC orders directing designated telecommunications 
service providers to produce all business records created that 
contain information about communications between 
telephone identifiers relating to telephone calls made 
between the United States and a foreign country and those 
wholly within the United States.19 The NSA collects pre-
existing business records of the telecommunications 
providers, and does not itself create or record any of the 
information.20 Since May 2006, at least fifteen different FISC 
judges have entered at least thirty-five such orders 
authorizing the NSA’s bulk collection of telephony 
metadata.21 The telephony metadata that FISC orders 
authorize the Government to collect include the telephone 
numbers that placed and received the call, other session-
identifying information, trunk identifier, telephone calling 
card number, and the date, time, and duration of the call.22 
The FISC orders do not authorize the Government to collect 
the content of any call, nor the cell site locational 
  
 17. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012) (alterations added) (emphasis added). 
 18. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A)-(B). 
 19. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 734; Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶¶ 13-
14. 
 20. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 18. 
 21. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Primary Order, BR 13-80 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 
2013) [hereinafter Primary Order]; Declaration of Acting Assistant Director 
Robert J. Holley, Federal Bureau of Investigation ¶ 11, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13-cv-3994) [hereinafter Holley Declaration]; 
Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 14. 
 22. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 15. 
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information, names, addresses, or financial information of 
any parties to any call.23 
After receiving telephony metadata information from 
telecommunications providers, the NSA compiles and stores 
the information in one database under “carefully controlled 
circumstances” and may keep the information for up to five 
years.24 The NSA may access the stored telephony metadata 
only through queries using metadata identifiers.25 An 
identifier used to commence a query, called a “seed,” must be 
approved by any of twenty-two designated officials.26 To 
approve a seed, one of the approving officials must determine 
that “based on the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, 
there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion (RAS) that the selection term to be queried” is in 
association with an international terrorist organization 
subject to an FBI investigation, but that association cannot 
be solely based on activities protected under the First 
Amendment.27  
Analysis is not limited strictly to the approved identifier, 
but also extends to second- and third-tier contacts of the 
identifier, known as “hops.”28 The identifiers directly in 
contact with the seed identifier are contained in the first hop, 
those identifiers in direct contact with the first hop 
identifiers comprise the second hop, and those identifiers in 
direct contact with the second hop constitute the third hop.29 
NSA officials analyze this information to see which results 
  
 23. Id. 
 24. Primary Order, supra note 21, at 14; Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶¶ 
16, 23, 30. 
 25. A common example of an identifier is a telephone number that is associated 
with a foreign terrorist organization. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 19. 
 26. Primary Order, supra note 21, at 7; Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 20. 
 27. Primary Order, supra note 21, at 7. “The RAS requirement ensures an 
ordered and controlled querying of the collected data” and is intended “to prevent 
any general browsing of [such] data.” Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 20.  
 28. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 22. 
 29. Id. 
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are likely to be of investigative value to the FBI.30 While 
extremely high volumes of data are collected pursuant to the 
Program, only a small percentage is reviewed by analysts.31 
If the FBI chooses to investigate a telephone number tipped 
to it through the Program, “the FBI must rely on publicly 
available information, other available intelligence, or other 
legal processes in order to identify the subscribers of any of 
the numbers that are retrieved.”32  
In accordance with Section 215, there are several 
minimization procedures in place to help control the 
Program.33 First, the NSA stores and processes the metadata 
in repositories within secure networks, and access is 
permitted only for purposes allowed under the FISC’s order.34 
Second, stored “metadata must be destroyed no later than 
five years after [its] initial collection.”35 Third, as previously 
noted, no one other than any of twenty-two designated 
officials “can make findings of RAS that a proposed seed 
identifier is associated with a specified terrorist 
organization.”36 And, for identifiers associated with United 
States persons, it must also be determined that the RAS 
finding “is not based solely on activities protected by the First 
  
 30. Id. ¶ 26. 
 31. Id. ¶ 5. In 2012, for example, “fewer than 300” unique identifiers met the 
RAS standard and were used as seeds to query data. Id. ¶ 24. While the number 
of metadata records responsive to these queries is not known, due to the three-
tiered “hop” analysis, the number is “substantially larger than 300,” but is still a 
very small percentage of the total metadata collected. Id. 
 32. WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 4. An example provided in the White Paper 
is of the FBI’s use of  
a grand jury subpoena to a telephone company to obtain subscriber 
information for a telephone number. If . . . the FBI were able to develop 
probable cause to believe [the number] was being used by an agent of a 
foreign terrorist organization, the FBI could [then] apply to the FISC for 
an order under Title 1 of FISA to authorize interception of the contents 
of future communications to and from that telephone number. 
Id. (alterations and omission added). 
 33. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g) (2012). 
 34. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 30. 
 35. WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 5; Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 30. 
 36. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 31 (emphasis added).  
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Amendment.”37 Fourth, “no [query] results may be 
disseminated outside of the NSA except in accordance with 
the minimization and dissemination requirements and 
established NSA procedures.”38 Prior to the dissemination of 
any United States person’s information, one of a few high-
ranking NSA officials “must determine that the information 
is in fact related to counterterrorism information, and is 
necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or 
assess its importance.”39 Fifth, the NSA uses “stringent and 
mutually reinforcing technological and personnel training 
measures to ensure that queries will be made only as to 
identifiers about which RAS has been established.”40 Sixth, 
the program is subject to both internal and external 
oversight.41 Compliance issues identified by any of the 
overseeing parties are reported to the FISC, and significant 
compliance issues are reported to the Intelligence and 
Judiciary Committees of both houses of Congress.42 Despite 
the various controls in effect, the Government has 
acknowledged and responded to compliance and 
implementation incidents that have taken place since the 
program’s inception.43  
II. ACLU V. CLAPPER 
In ACLU v. Clapper, Judge Pauley opened his opinion 
with a brief recollection of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, focusing 
on calls made by 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar to an al-
Qaeda safe house in Yemen that were intercepted by the 
  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. ¶ 32. 
 39. Id. (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. ¶ 33. “Intelligence analysts receive comprehensive training on the 
minimization procedures applicable to the use, handling, and dissemination of 
the metadata, and technical controls that prevent NSA intelligence analysts from 
seeing any metadata unless as the result of a query using an approved identifier.” 
Id. 
 41. Id. ¶ 34. For example, the Program is monitored by the Department of 
Justice, FISC, and Congress. Id. 
 42. Id. ¶ 35. 
 43. See, e.g., WHITE PAPER, supra note 6. 
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NSA.44 Judge Pauley went on to state that the intelligence 
used by the NSA did not capture Mihdhar’s telephone 
number identifier, and as a result, the NSA mistakenly 
concluded Mihdhar was outside the United States.45 
“Learn[ing] from its mistake,” the Government launched new 
intelligence counter-measures, including the Program.46 
Judge Pauley called the Program a “blunt tool,” one that 
“only works because it collects everything” and that could 
“imperil[ ] the civil liberties of every citizen” if it was 
unrestrained.47 According to Judge Pauley, the Program, 
despite highlighting the “natural tension between protecting 
the nation and preserving civil liberty,” was lawful.48  
Before launching into his discussion of the Program, 
Judge Pauley first discussed the Program’s relevant 
background. Judge Pauley discussed the enactment of FISA 
in 1978 and its subsequent expansion by Section 215 of the 
USA Patriot Act in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.49 He commented on the “extensive oversight” the 
Program is subjected to, the steps the Government must take 
to obtain judicial approval for its collection under the 
Program, and the reporting requirements the Government 
owes to the intelligence committees of the House and 
Senate.50 The opinion also addressed the various compliance 
issues regarding the Program, but concluded the NSA 
reported the issues to the FISC and Congress and had since 
“addressed these problems.”51  
The first issue the court addressed in Clapper was 
whether Plaintiffs had standing to sue.52 The requirement 
that plaintiffs first establish their standing to sue comes from 
  
 44. 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 729-30. 
 47. Id. at 730. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 731-32. 
 50. Id. at 732. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 735-36. 
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the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III of the 
United States Constitution.53 Article III standing requires 
that an injury be “concrete, particularized, and actual or 
imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged 
action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”54 Plaintiffs 
alleged injury in the Government’s collection of their 
telephony metadata, the search of the collected metadata 
resulting from any query by the NSA, and the chilling effect 
on the ACLU’s potential and current clients who will not 
contact the ACLU because of the Government’s collection.55 
The Government, in opposition, relied on the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International56 
and argued that none of Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries met the 
requirements of Article III.57 Judge Pauley, agreeing with 
Plaintiffs that they satisfied the standing requirement, 
distinguished Amnesty International. Unlike Amnesty 
International, which was decided before the Program was 
revealed,58 there was “no dispute” that the Government 
collected Plaintiffs’ telephony metadata, thus constituting 
actual injury.59 
The court then addressed Plaintiffs’ statutory claims. In 
particular, Plaintiffs claimed that the NSA exceeded its 
authority under FISA’s “tangible things” provision in 
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).60 
  
 53. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 54. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
 55. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 736. 
 56. 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013) (holding plaintiffs’ “highly speculative fear” 
that their communications would be intercepted was based on a “highly 
attenuated chain of possibilities” and thus insufficient to show the immanency 
required to establish injury in fact). 
 57. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 736. 
 58. Amnesty International was decided on February 26, 2013, over three 
months before the first revelations about the NSA’s Program. See Amnesty Int’l, 
133 S. Ct. at 1138; supra Introduction. 
 59. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 738. 
 60. Id. at 738-42. Section 706 of the APA provides, in relevant part, that a 
reviewing court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
404 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63  
Pursuant to Section 702 of the APA, a person “suffering legal 
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action” is permitted to sue the United 
States for “relief other than money damages.”61 However, this 
waiver of sovereign immunity62 can be overcome where 
“congressional intent to preclude judicial review is ‘fairly 
discernible in the statutory scheme.’”63 Congressional intent 
can be determined by examining specific language, specific 
legislative history, or inferences of intent drawn from the 
statutory scheme as a whole.64  
Judge Pauley, examining the USA Patriot Act and FISA’s 
overall statutory scheme, concluded that “Congress withdrew 
the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for section 215.”65 
Congress’s concern, noted Judge Pauley, was to provide 
redress for policy violations in cases where the Government 
took steps to generate evidence, but not where the 
Government obtained evidence created solely in the ordinary 
course of business of a third party.66 Even under Section 701 
of the APA, which withdraws sovereign immunity “to the 
extent [the relevant] statutes preclude judicial review,”67 
Judge Pauley found support in FISA’s statutory scheme that 
“section 215 does not provide for any person other than a 
recipient of an order to challenge the orders’ legality or 
otherwise participate in the process,” and to hold otherwise 
would “undermine the Government’s vital interest” in the 
secrecy of the Program.68  
  
conclusions found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 61. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 62. “The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit unless it 
unequivocally consents to be sued.” Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (citing United 
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)). 
 63. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984). 
 64. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (quoting Block, 467 U.S. at 349). 
 65. Id. at 740.  
 66. Id. 
 67. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2012). 
 68. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 741 (citation omitted). Even more than 
undermining a vital Government interest, Judge Pauley would consider it absurd 
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Even though it decided Plaintiffs’ statutory claims were 
precluded, the court assessed the merits of the claims. When 
seeking a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must establish 
four things: that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; 
(2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence 
of a preliminary injunction; (3) the balance of equities tips in 
their favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.69 
The court held that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their statutory claim.70 
The court addressed Plaintiffs’ contentions that Section 215 
needed to be interpreted narrowly to avoid conflict with the 
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), that collection under 
the Program was overbroad because it covered voluminous 
amounts of irrelevant data, and whether Congress ratified 
the Government’s interpretation of Section 215.71 
On the first matter, the court held that harmony between 
the SCA and Section 215 existed if the SCA was read to allow 
the collection of telephony metadata through Section 215 
orders.72 The SCA allows communication providers to divulge 
subscribers’ records to government entities if the government 
obtains a warrant, an administrative subpoena, a grand jury 
or trial subpoena, an order issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, or 
a national security letter.73 However, the records sought must 
always be “relevant” to an authorized investigation of 
international terrorist or clandestine intelligence activities.74 
Section 215, in similar fashion, permits the government to 
require the production of “tangible things” so long as the 
Government provides facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe the tangible things sought are 
“relevant” to a foreign intelligence investigation.75 These 
  
if the “lawbreaking conduct by a government contractor that reveals state 
secrets . . . could frustrate Congress’s intent.” Id. at 742. 
 69. Id. (quoting Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 742-49. 
 72. Id. at 743. 
 73. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012). 
 74. See id. § 2709(b)(1). 
 75. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012). 
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Section 215 orders, according to the court, are “functionally 
equivalent to grand jury subpoenas,” and thus allowing such 
orders to be obtained is in harmony with the SCA.76 
On the second matter—whether the Program was 
overbroad—the court employed a highly deferential stance in 
the Government’s favor.77 Tangible items are relevant, 
according to the court, if they bear on or could reasonably 
lead to other matter that could bear on the investigation.78 
The Program required the collection of “virtually all” 
telephony metadata in order to be comprehensive.79 Since 
there was no way for the Government to know in advance 
what telephony metadata might lead to counterterrorism 
information, aggregated collections of the information was 
necessary.80 The court concluded that telephony metadata, as 
a category, was relevant and thus not overbroad as Plaintiffs 
alleged.81 
On the third matter, the court found that Congress had 
ratified the Government’s interpretation of Section 215. 
Congress is presumed to be aware of a statute’s 
interpretation, and to adopt that interpretation when it re-
enacts a statute without change.82 On a semi-annual basis, 
the Government must provide reports to the House and 
Senate intelligence and judiciary committees that include a 
summary of any significant FISC interpretations involving 
Section 215 matters and any FISC documents including 
significant constructions or interpretations of Section 215.83 
In 2010, the court noted, the Executive Branch produced a 
classified five-page document discussing the Program that 
was made available to the entire body of Congress.84 An 
  
 76. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 743. 
 77. Id. at 747. 
 78. Id. at 746. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 747. 
 81. Id. at 748. 
 82. Id. at 743-44 (quoting Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239-40 
(2009)). 
 83. See id. at 744 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1871 (2012)). 
 84. Id. at 744. 
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updated version of this document was made available again 
to the entire body of Congress in 2011.85 In both 2010 and 
2011, after the documents were made available, Congress re-
authorized Section 215 without change.86 This, according to 
the court, showed that Congress ratified the Executive’s 
interpretation of Section 215.87 
Despite finding that it could not hear Plaintiffs’ statutory 
claims, the court was not precluded from addressing their 
constitutional claims.88 Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim 
was grounded in the idea that the Program’s long-term 
recording and aggregation of telephony metadata invaded 
their reasonable expectation of privacy and thus constituted 
a search under the Fourth Amendment.89 Plaintiffs concluded 
that this search violated the Fourth Amendment because it 
was warrantless and lacked any indicia of reasonableness.90 
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim alleged that the Program 
violated their rights to private association and free speech.91 
The Program, according to Plaintiffs, “chill[ed]” their 
associational and expressive freedoms and exposed all of 
their (often-sensitive) contacts to Government monitoring.92 
The court rejected Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment 
argument. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”93 A 
search occurs under the Fourth Amendment when the 
Government violates a “subjective expectation of privacy that 
  
 85. Id. at 745. 
 86. Id. at 744. 
 87. Id. at 745. 
 88. Id. at 749. 
 89. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss at 26-29, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(No. 13-cv-3994). 
 90. See id. at 26-35. 
 91. See id. at 35. 
 92. See id. at 35-40. 
 93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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society recognizes as reasonable.”94 Thus, the threshold 
Fourth Amendment question faced in Clapper was whether 
telephone subscribers have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their telephony metadata.95 If the answer to this 
question was yes, a Fourth Amendment search occurred, and 
the inquiry turns to whether the individual’s subjective 
expectation of privacy is one that society is willing to 
recognize as reasonable.96  
The main focus of the court’s Fourth Amendment 
analysis was the 1979 Supreme Court case Smith v. 
Maryland.97 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that 
telephone subscribers have “no legitimate expectation of 
privacy” in the numbers they dial.98 Telephone customers, 
Smith held, have no subjective expectation of privacy because 
they knowingly “convey numerical information to the phone 
company . . . [knowing] the phone company has facilities for 
recording this information . . . and [knowing] the phone 
company does in fact record this information for . . . business 
purposes.”99 Even if a telephone user did have a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed, continued the 
Court, this expectation was “not ‘one that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable,’” because there is no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over 
to third parties.100  
Judge Pauley rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the 
Program allowed the “creation of a rich mosaic” that revealed 
deeply personal and intimate aspects of a person’s life.101 
  
 94. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 95. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 96. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006). 
 97. 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 749-50. 
 98. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743. 
 99. Id. (alterations and omissions added). 
 100. Id. at 743-44 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 101. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 750. In particular, Plaintiffs alleged the 
Program could “reveal a person’s religion, political associations, use of a 
telephone-sex hotline, contemplation of suicide, addiction to gambling or drugs, 
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Judge Pauley pointed out that the NSA could not query the 
telephony metadata without additional legal justification, 
the information obtained when queries were performed only 
extended three hops from the identifier, and the NSA could 
not tell who the identifiers belonged to.102 Judge Pauley also 
dismissed Plaintiffs’ contentions that the Government could 
perform its three-hop analysis without building an 
aggregated database as “judicial-Monday-morning-
quarterbacking.”103 Such after-the-fact evaluations were 
dangerous, according to the court, and there is no 
requirement that only the “least intrusive” searches are 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.104 
Another problem the court had with Plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment argument was their “fundamental 
misapprehension” about ownership of the telephony 
metadata. The “tangible things” obtained by the FISC 
orders—the business records—were not Plaintiffs’ records, 
but Verizon’s records.105 This distinction was important for 
the court, because it triggered the third-party doctrine,106 
under which a person forfeits his right to privacy in 
information voluntarily conveyed to third parties.107 
Additionally, since the records belong to Verizon—and not 
Plaintiffs—their subsequent querying did not implicate any 
Fourth Amendment interest of Plaintiffs.108 
Finally, the court examined Plaintiffs’ reliance on a 
recent case, United States v. Jones,109 in the context of Smith 
v. Maryland. In Jones, the Supreme Court held that a search 
occurred where a GPS tracking device was attached, without 
a warrant, to a suspect’s car and monitored for twenty-eight 
  
experience with rape, grappling with sexuality, or support for particular political 
causes.” Id. 
 102. Id. at 750-51. 
 103. Id. at 751. 
 104. Id. (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 763 (2010)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
 107. Id. at 742-43. 
 108. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 751. 
 109. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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days.110 The Court held that this constituted a search because 
it was a physical intrusion for the purpose of obtaining 
information.111 Two concurring opinions, authored by Justices 
Alito and Sotomayor, found the surveillance also constituted 
a search because it invaded reasonable expectations of 
privacy.112 Plaintiffs contended the search in Clapper was the 
same kind of search—if not more intrusive—as that 
considered by the concurring Justices, and that the court 
should follow the reasoning of the Jones concurrences, not 
Smith’s.113 
In response to this argument, however, Judge Pauley 
pointed to the fact that Jones did not overrule Smith. If 
Supreme Court precedent has direct application to a case, 
even where it “appears to rest on reasons rejected in some 
other line of decisions,” inferior courts “should follow the case 
which directly controls” and “leav[e] to [the Supreme] Court 
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”114 The 
Program does not violate the Fourth Amendment, Judge 
Pauley held, because Smith, as “[c]lear precedent,” held that 
a telephone “subscriber has no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in telephony metadata created by third parties.”115 
This result is not changed by the ubiquity of cell phones or 
the different relationship that exists between persons and 
their phones now as opposed to when Smith was decided.116 
The increase in the number of calls made and the versatility 
and multiple uses of cell phones do not change this result.117 
  
 110. Id. at 948-49. 
 111. Id. at 949. 
 112. Id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (finding individuals have a 
“reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of [their] public 
movements” that is violated by continuous GPS monitoring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most 
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”). 
 113. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 89, at 27-29. 
 114. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989) (alterations added); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997). 
 115. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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Most importantly, Judge Pauley acknowledged, “what 
metadata is has not changed over time . . . [a]s in Smith, the 
types of information at issue in this case are relatively 
limited: [tele]phone numbers dialed, date, time, and the 
like.”118 Since he found no search occurred, Judge Pauley did 
not address the question of reasonableness.119 
Having concluded that no Fourth Amendment search 
occurred, Judge Pauley turned to address Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment claim.120 Plaintiffs alleged that the Program 
violated the First Amendment because it was likely to have 
a “chilling effect” on individuals who would otherwise contact 
them.121 The court, once again, rejected Plaintiffs’ argument. 
First, the court agreed with the Government’s position that 
“surveillance consistent with Fourth Amendment 
protections . . . does not violate First Amendment rights, even 
though it may be directed at communicative or associative 
activities.”122 The court further concluded that Clapper v. 
Amnesty International compelled the conclusion that the 
Program did not substantially burden First Amendment 
rights.123 Like in Amnesty International, Plaintiffs’ 
speculative “[f]ear that telephony metadata” would be 
queried “relie[d] on a highly attenuated chain of 
possibilities.”124 This fear was insufficient to establish a 
violation of First Amendment rights.125  
The court thus concluded that Plaintiffs failed to state a 
claim and that their case must be dismissed. Before finishing 
  
 118. Id. (quoting Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35 (D.D.C. 2014)) 
(emphasis and alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 119. Id. at 749-52. 
 120. The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 121. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 753. 
 122. Id. (quoting Gordon v. Warren Consol. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778, 781 n.3 
(6th Cir. 1983)) (omission in original). 
 123. Id. at 753-54. 
 124. Id. at 754 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2012)) 
(alterations added). 
 125. Id. 
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his opinion, however, Judge Pauley engaged in a balancing of 
the equities and public interest to show that, even if Plaintiffs 
could show a likelihood of success on the merits, a 
preliminary injunction would still be inappropriate. The 
Government’s interest in combating terrorism, he held, 
seriously outweighed any privacy interest Plaintiffs could 
point to, and “proper deference” was owed to the Government 
on the subject of national security.126 While it was restricted 
on the information it could share, the Government offered 
illustrations of three situations in which the Program 
allegedly helped combat terrorism.127 Judge Pauley found 
“ample justification” in these three examples, concluding the 
“effectiveness of bulk telephony metadata collection cannot 
be seriously disputed.”128 
In the conclusion of his opinion, Judge Pauley returned 
to where he started: the 9/11 terrorist attacks. By its own 
design, he noted, the Program “vacuums up” mass quantities 
of information so the Government can detect terrorist 
relationships and avoid tragic results like the 9/11 attacks.129 
The court’s role was to “reject as false, claims in the name of 
civil liberty,” like those brought by Plaintiffs, that would 
“paralyze or impair [the Government’s] authority” to protect 
the nation.130 The bigger danger to civil liberties, proffered 
Judge Pauley, was the success of a terrorist attack on 
American soil.131 Thus, he concluded the Program was lawful 
and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss.132  
  
 126. Id. 
 127. Holley Declaration, supra note 21, ¶¶ 24-26. For example, the NSA, 
through the Program, gave information to the FBI about an individual in Kansas 
City with ties to an overseas al-Qaeda extremist. Working off this tip, the FBI 
discovered a previously unknown plot to attack the New York Stock Exchange 
and identified and arrested several individuals involved. Id. ¶ 24. 
 128. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 755. 
 129. Id. at 757. 
 130. Id. (alteration added). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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III. KLAYMAN V. OBAMA 
On January 2, 2014, the ACLU filed its notice of appeal 
to the Second Circuit.133 On appeal, the most contested issue 
is likely to be whether the Program violates the Fourth 
Amendment. Despite Judge Pauley’s ruling that the Program 
does not constitute a search under, and thus does not 
constitute a violation of, the Fourth Amendment, this view is 
not universally accepted. In fact, only eleven days before 
Clapper was decided, a case in the District Court of the 
District of Colombia, Klayman v. Obama, yielded a 
conflicting result.134 As it did in Clapper, the Government 
relied on Smith v. Maryland, contending that no one has an 
expectation of privacy in the telephony metadata that 
telephone providers hold as business records.135 Judge Leon, 
presiding over the case, concluded not only that the Program 
constituted a search that was likely unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, but also that Smith could not 
adequately guide his decision.136  
In fact, Judge Leon found the question he faced in 
Klayman to be a “far cry” from the question presented in 
Smith thirty-four years prior.137 The question for Judge Leon 
was not “whether the installation and use of a pen register 
constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment,” but “when do present-day circumstances—the 
evolutions in the Government’s surveillance capabilities, 
citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship between the NSA 
and telecom companies—become so thoroughly unlike those 
considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years ago that 
  
 133. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, No. 13-cv-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 
2013), appeal filed, Notice of Appeal, No. 13-cv-3994 (2d Cir. Jan. 2, 2014).  
 134. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 135. See, e.g., Government Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions for 
Preliminary Injunctions at 46-47, Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2013) (Nos. 1:13-cv-0851, 1:13-cv-0881). 
 136. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32-37. 
 137. Id. at 31. 
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a precedent like Smith simply does not apply?”138 Judge Leon 
answered: “now.”139  
According to Judge Leon, the Government’s present-day 
surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the 
NSA’s relationship with telecommunication companies had 
become “so thoroughly unlike” the situation faced in Smith 
that Smith’s precedent could no longer apply.140 First, 
whereas the pen register used in Smith were in use “for only 
a matter of days,”141 and there was no expectation that the 
records obtained through it would be retained after the 
investigation’s finish, the NSA’s program involved the 
creation of a historical database containing five years’ worth 
of metadata and was potentially endless.142  
Second, the relationship between the police and the 
phone company in Smith and the relationship between the 
NSA and telecom companies in the present case were vastly 
different. Whereas the phone company in Smith installed an 
individual pen register at the police’s request, telecom 
companies, pursuant to FISC orders, must turn over call 
detail records to the NSA “on a daily basis,” with order 
renewals happening frequently over several years.143 For 
Judge Leon, this “formalized policy” permitting the “daily, 
all-encompassing, indiscriminate dump” of telephony 
metadata to the NSA went far beyond the individualized 
request for data seen in Smith.144 The “almost-Orwellian” 
technology at issue in Klayman was “at best . . . the stuff of 
science fiction” when Smith was decided.145  
Most importantly for Judge Leon was the vast difference 
in peoples’ usage of and relationships with their personal 
  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 32. 
 142. “[T]here is the very real prospect that the program will go on for as long as 
America is combating terrorism, which realistically could be forever!” Id.   
 143. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 144. Id. at 33. 
 145. Id. (omission added). 
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phones between 1979 and the present-day.146 While conceding 
that what metadata is has not changed since 1979, Judge 
Leon found that the nature and quantity of the information 
contained in telephony metadata is much greater now than 
it was in 1979.147 In addition to the drastic increase in the 
ubiquity of mobile phones, their use has drastically 
transformed as well, with mobile phones most often used as 
“multi-purpose devices.”148 According to Judge Leon, due to 
our now “phone-centric culture,” telephony metadata has the 
potential to reveal “‘a wealth of detail about [a person’s] 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations’149 . . . an entire mosaic—a vibrant and 
constantly updating picture of the person’s life.”150 These 
“trends,” Judge Leon proposed, have led to “greater 
expectation[s] of privacy and a recognition that society views 
[those] expectation[s] as reasonable.”151 In light of these 
Fourth Amendment violations, Judge Leon granted the 
Klayman plaintiffs’ requests for a preliminary injunction, but 
stayed his order pending appeal.152 On January 3, 2014, the 
Government filed its notice of appeal to the Circuit Court for 
the District of Colombia.153 
IV. CLAPPER VERSUS KLAYMAN: WHO WAS RIGHT? 
The conflicting opinions of Clapper and Klayman pose 
interesting questions. On appeal, should the Second Circuit 
adhere to Judge Pauley’s reasoning on the Fourth 
Amendment issue and affirm, or should it adopt the 
  
 146. Id. at 33-34. 
 147. Id. at 34-35. 
 148. Id. at 34 (“They are now maps and music players. . . . [t]hey are 
cameras. . . . [t]hey are even lighters people hold up at rock concerts.”). 
 149. Id. at 36 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)) (alteration added). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (alterations added) (emphasis in original). 
 152. Id. at 9-10. 
 153. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, Nos. 1:13-cv-00851, 1:13-cv-00881 
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013), appeal filed, Government Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, 
Nos. 1:13-cv-00851, 1:13-cv-00881 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 3, 2014). 
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reasoning of Judge Leon? The answer is not clear-cut, but the 
argument weighs in Judge Pauley’s favor. Even so, the 
concerns echoed in Klayman must not be ignored. 
As articulated by Judge Pauley, Supreme Court 
precedent binds inferior courts.154 If Supreme Court 
precedent has direct application to a case, even where it 
“appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 
decisions,” inferior courts should follow the controlling 
case.155 Since the information obtained through the Program 
is the same information obtained in Smith, its application is 
clear: the NSA’s collection of telephony metadata is “squarely 
controlled” by Smith.156 Like a pen register, the Program does 
not obtain the contents of communications or locational 
information.157 The Program merely obtains the telephone 
numbers that have been dialed, when the call occurred, and 
the length of the call.158  
Some, like the Klayman and Clapper plaintiffs, seem to 
suggest that Smith’s holding has been eroded by the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones.159 However, 
the Program does not present the same issue as that 
addressed in Jones. Jones considered the constitutionality of 
attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle and monitoring 
the vehicle’s movement over a twenty-eight-day period.160 The 
Court unanimously agreed this constituted a search, but the 
majority concluded only on the basis that this was a physical 
trespass.161 The Jones Court declined to address the question 
  
 154. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 155. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989) (alterations added); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997). 
 156. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], BR 13-109, at 6 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). 
 157. But see Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth 
Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681 (2011) (arguing that 
cell phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone 
location data under the Fourth Amendment). 
 158. See supra Part I. 
 159. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 89, at 27-29. 
 160. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948-49 (2012). 
 161. Id. at 949-50. 
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of whether such long-term tracking would constitute a search 
absent physical trespass.  
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor opined that 
long term monitoring infringes upon an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment. Long-term monitoring, 
she said, “generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail 
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”162 While the Jones concurrences 
appeared to suggest changing technologies might lead to 
increased expectations of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment,163 this suggestion neither controlled the court 
nor undermined Smith. Smith has still not been eroded with 
respect to numbers dialed, and has in fact been extended to 
a degree.164  
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor also criticized the 
third-party doctrine as “ill suited [sic] to the digital age.”165 
Despite facing criticism, the third-party doctrine—one of the 
key underpinnings of Smith—has not been discarded.166 The 
principle that individuals who voluntarily disclose 
information to third parties lose Fourth Amendment 
protection, as echoed in Smith, stands firm. Just as in 1979, 
telephone subscribers voluntarily disclose the numbers they 
dial to their telephone companies. Just as in 1979, telephone 
  
 162. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 163. See id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing that individuals have 
a “reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of [their] public 
movements” that is violated by continuous GPS monitoring) (alteration added); 
id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that “the use of longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy”). 
 164. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding, 
in light of Smith, that e-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in 
the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the website they 
visit because they voluntarily turn that information over to third parties). 
 165. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 166. See, e.g., Jeremy H. Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment 
and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 
506-10 (2012) (“Smith remains strong as applied to information analogous to 
numbers dialed . . . .”). 
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subscribers should know that their telephone providers have 
the facilities for recording that information. Just as in 1979, 
telephone subscribers should know that their telephone 
provider would record that information for business 
purposes. Where, as here, telephone subscribers should 
reasonably know their telephone providers will record this 
information in the ordinary course of business, they cannot 
legitimately expect privacy. And, where there is no 
subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy, no Fourth 
Amendment search has occurred. And, where one individual 
does not have a Fourth Amendment interest, grouping 
together numerous similarly situated individuals will not 
create a Fourth Amendment interest “ex nihilo.”167  
However, in today’s digital age, it would be nearly 
impossible for an individual to enjoy use of their cell phone 
without needing to go through a third-party cell phone 
provider. Furthermore, in today’s digital age, it would be 
foolhardy to suggest that an individual forego use of his cell 
phone in order to retain protection under the Fourth 
Amendment. Cell phones are more than just casual means of 
communication: they are maps, music players, business 
planners, and cameras. While Supreme Court precedent 
demands the result that cell phone users relinquish Fourth 
Amendment protection in their telephony metadata through 
use of a cell phone provider, this result only serves to 
underscore the outdated state of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
In Clapper, the court refused to ignore the important 
national security interest in fighting terrorism and dismantle 
a vital tool for identifying terrorist threats. In Clapper, the 
court refused to substitute its own judgment for that of the 
at least fifteen FISC judges who concluded the Program was 
lawful on at least fifteen occasions.168 In Clapper, the court 
refused to depart from binding Supreme Court precedent and 
  
 167. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things from [REDACTED], Docket No. BR 13-109, at 9 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). 
 168. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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predict whether the Supreme Court would later overrule a 
precedent. 
In light of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
Clapper was correctly decided. However, what Clapper 
demonstrates, more than anything, is the need to revisit 
Fourth Amendment protection in light of changing 
technology. Intervention—whether by the Supreme Court, 
Congress, or the Executive itself—is needed. Until then, 
some peace of mind can be found in the fact that the Program 
concerns contentless information. As previously explained, 
the Program only obtains the ten-digit telephone numbers on 
the dialing and receiving ends of a call, when the call 
occurred, and how long the call lasted. There is no identifying 
or locational information collected by the Program. And, in 
order to use the information collected to achieve such a goal, 
additional legal and investigative moves would need to be 
taken by the FBI or other investigating agency. In light of 
these additional—and heavily restricted—steps, it appears 
impossible for the Program to create a “record of a person’s 
public movements” that is detailed enough to reveal intimate 
details of a person’s life.169  
Only time will tell if the Supreme Court will step in and 
settle the debate, if Congress will change the laws upon 
which the Program is grounded, or if the Executive will alter 
the Program to increase oversight and transparency. Until 
then, Clapper should be limited to its facts and must not be 
extended to other types of intelligence surveillance, such as 
those that would include content information.  
 
  
 169. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
